[Jurnal] Walid Jumblat dan Aliansi Politik: Politik Adaptasi (3)

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jumblatMeninggalkan 14th of March Movement (Juni 2009- Juni 2010)

Pada Juli 2009, Jumblat mengumumkan bahwa ia tengah memikirkan matang-matang tentang keinginnnya untuk meninggalkan 14th of March Movement. Di dalam wawancaranya, ia menjelaskan, “We need always to follow up on what is happening in the international and regional levels, and we should adjust our strategies and political positions accordingly.”

Jumblat juga merujuk pada perubahan wacana politik internasional setelah melihat hasil pemilihan presiden di Perancis pada tahun 2007 dan pemilihan presiden di AS pada tahun 2008. Hal ini membawa perubahan yang sangat serius di Timur Tengah, terutama di Lebanon dan Suriah. Baik Presiden Nicolas Sarkozy maupun Presiden Barack Obama, telah menyatakan akan melakukan kontak dengan rezim Suriah.

Nampaknya, ada dua indikasi yang melatarbelakangi perubahan wacana politik Jumblat. Pertama, International Tribunal for Lebanon, yang menginvestigasi pembunuh Hariri pada awal tahun 2009 menyatakan kecurigaannya terhadap ‘the four generals.’ Karena sosok ‘the four generals’ ini telah didepak dari daftar sekutu Suriah, maka kemungkinan, bukan Suriah yang berada di balik pembunuhan Hariri. Kemungkinan kedua adalah pemulihan hubungan antara Suriah dn Arab Saudi pada Juli 2009.

Maka, Jumblat pun berubah. Ia mulai menunjukkan dukungannya terhadap Hizbullah, sebaliknya, ia mulai mengkritisi Kristen Lebanon dan AS. Jumblat juga mendukung penuh pemulihan hubungan antara Suriah dengan Arab Saudi, dan menurutnya, hal itu akan membantu Lebanon dalam mengatasi berbagai perbedaan. Selanjutnya, ia secara terbuka mengkritisi 14th of March Movement, dan kritiknya diarahkan kepada kelompom Kristen yang menentang keras hubungan antara Lebanon-Suriah. Ia menyerukan kepada 14th of March Movement untuk membaca kembali agenda politiknya dan secara serius melakukan perubahan dalam tingkatan internasional. Puncaknya, pada 9 Agustus 2009, ia mendeklarasikan keluar dari aliansi dengan 14th of March Movement.

Secara terbuka, Jumblat mengkritisi pemerintah AS, dan berkata, “We made a mistake when we met with the neoconservatives in Washington and asked them for help…It was unusual for people like us to meet with people like them… people who are responsible for the destruction of Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon.”

Lalu dengan menunjukkan rasa hormatnya pada Suriah, Jumblat berkata, “I intend to put right my relationship with Damascus… Looking back, I think I committed an unforgivable mistake when I voiced too many anti-Syrian slogans. Lebanon and Syria always should be on good terms.

Saat diwawancarai oleh An Nahar pada 3 Januari 2010, Jumblat berkata bahwa Lenanon harus membangun ‘broad national front’, untuk mempersatukan negara, rekonsiliasi Lebaon dengan Suriah, dan menyatukan Lebanon untuk menghadapi Israel. Ia menyerukan agar rakyat Lebanon dan Suriah bisa bekerjasama meskipun memiliki perbedaan, mengingat adanya kedekatan sejarah, dan hal ini akan menguatkan hubungan sosial dan budaya.

Ia berkata, “The two countries [should] put behind them what happened in the last four years…They should learn from their mistakes and not repeat what had happened… The Lebanese and the Syrians have a long history of struggle against Israel and the West. This history should help them overcome what had happened after Hariri’s assassination.”

Setelah mengunjungi Damaskus pada tahun 2010, maka hubungan Jumblat dengan Suriah pun kembali membaik. Sebelumnya, ia bertemu dengan Sekretaris Jenderal Hizbullah,Hassan Nassrallah, pada musim semi 2009. Ia memuji Hizbullah yang telah melawan Israel pada perang tahun 2006. Ia berkata, “It had brought back the old days of glory and reminded him of the years he had spent struggling against Israel in the 1970s and 1980s. What Hezbollah in the 2006 war with Israel did was historical.”

Kesimpulan

Jumblat tidak hanya berhasil mempertahankan posisi politiknya selama lebih dari 3 dekade, tetapi ia juga berhasil mengembangkan kekuatan basis politiknya di komunitas Druze, dan semua ini berkat aliansi strategis yang dibangunnya. Jumblat melakukan aliansi yang berselang-seling dan tidak bisa diprediksi, ia bergonta-ganti sekutu dan wacana politik. Jumblat memilih siapa yang akan menjadi sekutunya berdasarkan apa yang terjadi dalam dinamika hubungan regional dan internasional yang mungkin memiliki dampak bagi Lebanon.

—-

[1] Correspondence Address: Lebanese American University, P. O. Box 36, Byblos, Lebanon. Marwan G.
Rowayheb. Email: marwan.rowayheb@lau.edu.lb

Footnote

  1. The Druze is one of Lebanon’s Islamic sects whose religious faith originated in a schism of the Fatamid (Shi’a sect) rulers of Egypt in the eleventh century. On the Druze, see Robert Brenton Betts (1988)The Druze(NewHaven and London: Yale University Press); Fuad Khury (2004)Being A Druze(London: The Druze Heritage Foundation); Philip Hitti (2007)The Origins of the Druze People and Religion: With Extracts from their Sacred Writings(London: Saqi Essentials)
  2. See sources in n. 1 for French policies and rule in Lebanon after World War I.
  3. Sectarian identification is understood here as an identification that relates to the religious sect with which the Lebanese identifies, such as the Maronite sect, Sh’ia sect (Shi‘i), the Sunni sect (Sunni), the Greek Orthodox sect (Rum Orthodoksi), etc.
  4. Farid El-Khazen (1991)The Communal Pact of National Identities: The Making and Politics of the 1943 National Pact, Occasional Papers on Lebanon, No. 12 (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies). For a detailed account of Lebanon’s constitution and the different reforms that were introduced, see “The Lebanese Constitution (1997)Arab Law Quarterly, 12(2), pp. 224–261.
  5. This study investigated the political discourse of Jumblat between 1997 and 2010, mainly in Annahar and Al Anba’. Annahar is an independent daily Lebanese newspaper.Al Anba’is the official newspaper published by Jumblat’s political party, the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). Both are published in Beirut. This study looked carefully into his speeches, press conferences, press releases and interviews from 1977 to 2010.
  6. Mordecai Nisan (2002)Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 2nd edition (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co.).
  7. Farid el Khazen (1988) Kamal Jumblatt, the Uncrowned Druze Prince of the Left,Middle Eastern Studies, 24(2), pp. 178 –205; Kamal Jumblat (1977)Sira Fikriyya: 1943–1977(Beirut: Manshurat Lajnat al-Qa’id al Shahid); Kamal Jumblat (1987)Fi al-Mumarasa wa al-Siyasa: Muqadimat Rub‘ Qarn fi al-Nidal[In Political Practice: Introduction to a Quarter Century of Resistance] (Beirut: al-Markaz al-Watani lil-Ma‘lumat wa alDirasat).
  8. See Michael Provence (2005)The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab Nationalism(Austin: University of Texas Press); Joyce Laverty Miller (1977) The Syrian Revolt of 1925,International Journal of Middle East Studies, 8(4), pp. 545–563; Khoury,Syria and the French Mandate; and William L. Cleveland (1985)Islam Against the West: Shakib Arslan and the Campaign for Islamic Nationalism(Austin: University of Texas Press).
  9. Judith P. Harik (1993a) Perceptions of Community and State Among Lebanon’s Druze Youth,Middle East Journal, 47(1), pp. 41–62; Judith P. Harik (1995) The Effect of the Military Tradition on the Lebanon’s Assertive Druzes,International Sociology, 10, pp. 51 –71.
  10. See for example Garry C Gambill & Nassif, Daniel (2001) Walid Jumblat: Head of Progressive Socialist Party (PSP),Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, 3(5), pp. 41–49; Aref Hamadeh (2001) Kira’a fi tajroubat Hizb: Al Hizb al Takadoumi al Istiraki(Beruit: NP), and Sami Moubayed (2001) Syria Loses its Former Ally in Lebanon, Druze Leader Walid Jumblatt, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 20(1), pp. 35–36.
  11. A few studies on leadership could be mentioned here: Michael Johnson (1986)Class and Client in Beirut: The Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanese State 1840–1975 (London: Ithaca Press), El Khazen Kamal Jumblatt, the Uncrowned Druze Prince of the Left, Fouad Ajami (1986)The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shi’a of Lebanon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), Wade Goria (1985)Sovereignty and Leadership in Lebanon 1943– 1976(London: Ithaca Press), and Majed Halawi (1992)A Lebanon Defied: Musa al-Sadr and the Shi‘ a Community(Boulder, CO: Westview Press).
  12. The two main families that led the Druze since the early twentieth century were the Arslans and the Jumblats. The Arslan family’s power among the Druze dates back to the seventeenth century. The Jumblats are the ancestors of a Kurdish chieftain who came from Aleppo Syria in the early seventeenth century and settled in the Chouf district of Mount Lebanon. See further Kamal Salibi (1993), The Modern History of Lebanon (Delmar: Caravan Books), pp. 9– 12.
  13. See Khazen,Jumblat, and Nazih Richani (1998) Dilemmas of Democracy and Political Parties in Sectarian Societies: The Case of the Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon 1949–1996(Basingstoke: Macmillan).
  14. Hamadeh,Kiaraa, pp. 95–99.
  15. The LNM was a self-proclaimed political alliance of progressive Arab nationalists founded in 1969. It was headed by Kamal Jumblat until his assassination 1977. Its sectarian composition included mainly Sunnis, Druze, and Greek Orthodox. Its main participants were theLebanese Communist Party(LCP), the Communist Action Organization (CAO), the PSP, theSyrian Social Nationalist Party(SSNP), both the pro-Syrian and the pro-Iraqi LebaneseBaath factions, al-Mourabitoun(a Nasseritegroup) and several other minor Nasserite groups. Several Palestinian organizations joined the LNM, notably many from the Rejectionist Front. Both the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine(PFLP) and theDemocratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) were active participants. For more information on the LNM see Sami Zubiyan (1977), Al-Haraka alWataniyya al-Lubnaniyya [The Lebanese National Movement] (Beirut: Dar al-Masira).
  16. El Khazen, Kamal Jumblat, and Hammadeh,Kiaraa.
  17. A number of Christians, mainly Maronite leaders, established the Lebanese Front when the civil war erupted in 1975.
  18. Naomi Joy Weinberger (1986)Syrian Intervention in Lebanon: The 1975–1976 Civil War(New York: Oxford University Press), Hamadeh,Kiaraa, pp. 89–104; Reuven Avi-Ran (1991)The Syrian Involvement in Lebanon Since 1975, David Maisel (tran.) (Boulder, CO: Westview Press); and Adeed I. Dawisha (1980) Syria and the Lebanese Crisis(London: Macmillan).
  19. Gambill & Nassif, Walid Jumblat, pp. 41–49.
  20. Ibid.
  21. Walid Jumblat (2009a) Interview, Future Television, Beirut, May 16
  22. Ibid.
  23. Ma‘oz Moshe & Avner Yaniv (eds) (1986)Syria under Assad: Domestic Constrains and Regional Risks (London: Croom Helm in Association with the Gustav Heinemann Institute of the Middle East Studies, University of Haifa); and Dawisha,Syria and the Lebanese Crisis.
  24. Ibid.
  25. Jumblat, Press Conference, Beirut, April 6, 1977; see Annahar, April 7, 1977.
  26. Jumblat, Press Conference, Damascus, April, 20, 1977; see Annahar, April 21, 1977.
  27. Jumblat, Speech, Beirut, March 16, 1979; seeAnnahar, March 17, 1979.
  28. Jumblat, Interview,MERIP Reports, No. 61 (Oct., 1977), p. 7.
  29. Ibid.
  30. Theodor Hanf (1993)Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation, John Richardson (tran.) (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies and I. B. Tauris); and Kirsten E. Schulze (1998) Israel’s Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon (Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with St Antony’s College, Oxford).
  31. Hanf, Coexistence, pp. 275 –280.
  32. Syria, during the 1980s, proved to be a very powerful actor in Lebanon that could not be easily defeated or even ignored. Syria stood against the US intervention in Lebanon’s internal affairs and managed to withstand the US attempt to weaken its grip over Lebanon. Syria then had the strong backing of the Soviet Union due to cold war considerations.
  33. Hanf,Coexistence, pp. 275– 280; Paul Andari (2001)Harb al-Jabal: Haqiqatun la Turham(Beirut: NP); and Hammadeh,Kiaraa, pp. 89 –144.
  34. Hanf,Coexistence, pp. 275–280.
  35. Ibid.
  36. Jumblat, Press Conference, Beirut, May 15, 1989; in Annahar, May 16, 1989.
  37. Ibid.
  38. Ibid.
  39. Jumblat Press Release, Beirut, August 7, 1988; inAnnahar, August 8, 1988.
  40. Ibid.
  41. Ibid.
  42. Jumblat, Speech, Beirut, August 18, 1988; inAnnahar, August 19, 1989.
  43. Ibid.
  44. Jumblat, Speech, Beirut, June 14, 1989; inAnnahar, June 15, 1989.
  45. Jumblat, Press conference, Beirut, March 10, 1983; inAnnahar, March 11, 1983.
  46. See William Harris (2006)The New Face of Lebanon: History’s Revenge(Princeton, NJ: Markus Publishers), pp. 279–315; Robert Rabil (2006)Syria, the United States and the War of Terror in the Middle East(Westport, CT: Praeger), pp. 82 –85; Habib Malik (2000)Between Damascus and Jerusalem: Lebanon and the Middle East Peace Process(Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), pp. 79– 84; and Volker Perthes (2006) Syrian Predominance in Lebanon: Not Immutable, in: Rosemary Hollis & Nadim Shehadi (eds) Lebanon on Hold: Implications for Middle East Peace(London: Center for Lebanese Studies), pp. 31–34.
  47. Ibid.
  48. Jumblat, Press Conference, Beirut, March 3, 1991; inAnnahar, March 4, 1991.
  49. Jumblat Press Conference, Beirut, November 8, 1991; inAnnahar, November 9, 1991.
  50. Jumblat, Press Release, Beirut, August 9, 1996; inAnnahar, August, 10 1996.
  51. Jumblat, Press Conference, Damascus, April 16, 1997; inAnnahar, April 17, 1997.
  52. See William Harris (2005) Bashar al Assad’s Lebanon Gamble,Middle East Quarterly, 12(3); Talal Nizameddin (2006) The Political Economy of Lebanon Under Rafik Hariri: An Interpretation,The Middle East Journal, 60(1); Najib Ghadjian, (2001) The New Assad: Dynamics of Continuity and Change in Syria, Middle East Journal, 55(4), pp. 624–641; ICG (2004) Syria under Bashar (1): Foreign Policy Challenges, ICG Middle East Report; Eyal Ziser (2007)Commanding Syria: Bashar al-Asad and the First Years in Power (London: I. B. Tauris); and David W. Lesch (2005)The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Asad and Modern Syria (New Haven: Yale University Press).
  53. Gambill & Nassif, Walid Jumblat.
  54. Ibid.
  55. Ibid.
  56. Moubayed, Syria Loses, pp. 35–36.
  57. Ibid.
  58. Ibid.
  59. Gambill & Nassif, Walid Jumblat.
  60. Jumblat, Speech published inAnnahar, March 15, 2006.
  61. Ibid.
  62. Wahab was a Druze figure who was unknown before he was adopted politically by Syria. Being the prote´ge´e of Syria, he was appointed a minister in the few pro-Syrian governments that were formed in the early 2000s.
  63. Waild Moubayed (2001) Lebanon Dodges Another Civil War,Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs, 20(4), pp. 35–36.
  64. Walid Jumblat, interviews published inAnnahar, May 11, 2001, and April 20, 2002.
  65. and W. Jumblat, speech, Beirut, May 10, 2001; inAnnahar, May 11, 2001.
  66. For more information on the names of Jumblat’s elections allies, see Hamadeh,Kiaraa, pp. 158 –159.
  67. Walid Jumblat, The Struggle for Lebanese Independence: One Year After Hariri’s Assassination, Interview with Walid Jumblat conducted by Mr Indyk (Falk Auditorium, Washington, March 6, 2006); and Gambill & Nassif, Walid Jumblat.
  68. Jumblat, Press Conference, Beirut, April 19, 2002; inAnnahar, April 20, 2002.
  69. Jumblat, Press Conference, Beirut, May 10, 2001; inAnnahar, May 11, 2001.
  70. Jumblat, Interview, Beirut, April 19, 2002; inAnnahar, April 20, 2002.
  71. Jumblat, Interview Beirut, August 18, 2000; inAnnahar, August 19, 2000.
  72. Jumblat, Speech, Beirut, November 8, 2003; inAnnahar, November 9, 2003.
  73. Ibid.
  74. Ibid.
  75. Jumblat, Press Release, Beirut, June 23, 2002; inAnnahar, June 24, 2002.
  76. Ibid.
  77. Jumblat, Interview with BBC; quoted fromAnnahar, September 23, 2003.
  78. Jumblat, Press Conference, Beirut, December 18, 2003; inAnnahar, December 19, 2003.
  79. Nicolos Blandford (2006) Killing Mr Lebanon: The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and its Impact on the Middle East (London: I.B. Taurus)
  80. Ibid.
  81. The United States and France sponsored and supported this resolution, which called for the consolidation of Lebanon’s sovereignty over all its territories and the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. It strongly urged Syria to stop intervening in Lebanon’s internal affairs. See UN Security Council resolution 1559. Available at:,http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/357/21/PDF/N0435721.pdf?OpenEl ement.accessed 10 October 2009.
  82. Dennis Ross (2005) US Policy toward a Weak Assad,The Washington Quarterly, 28(3), pp. 87–98; and Mona Yacoubian & Scott Lasensky (2008) Dealing with Damascus Seeking a Greater Return on US-Syria Relations,Council on Foreign Relations(CSR 33, No. 33).
  83. Ghadjian, The New Assad; ICG, Syria under Bashar (1); Ziser,Commanding Syria; and Lesch,The New Lion of Damascus.
  84. Ibid.
  85. Ibid.
  86. Blandford, Killing Mr Lebanon.
  87. The 14th of March Movement was a coalition of Christian, Muslim and Druze parties, factions and individuals formed in 2005 as a direct reaction to the assassination of Rafik Hariri. It was composed of, among others, the following political parties: the Future Movement (Sunni), the Progressive Socialist Party (Druze), Lebanese Forces (Christian), Kataib Party (Christian), National Liberal Party (Christian), Democratic left (mix), and the Free Shiite Movement (Shi’a).
  88. This statement was repeated in the different written documents that Jumblat had published inAl Anba’. See W. Jumblat, Weekly Statement,Al Anba’, December 25, 2007; October 30, 2007; and June 10, 2008.
  89. Ibid.
  90. ICG (2005) Syria After Lebanon, Lebanon After Syria,Middle East Report(39); and W. Jumblat, Weekly Statement toAl Anba’, March 19, 2008.
  91. Jumblat, Weekly Statement,Al Anba’, March 18, 2008.
  92. Ibid.
  93. Walid Jumblat, Interview,ANBtelevision, January 4, 2008; and W. Jumblat, Interview, The Guardian, February 22, 2008.
  94. Jumblat, Weekly Statement toAl Anba’, October 10, 2008.
  95. Ibid.
  96. Jumblat, Weekly Statement toAl Anba’, July 25, 2007.
  97. Jumblat, Weekly Statement toAl Anba’, October 16, 2007.
  98. Hammadeh, Walid Jumblat, pp. 95–99.
  99. Jumblat, Press Conference, Beirut, February 23, 2005, inAnnahar, February 24, 2005.
  100. Jumblat, Weekly Statement toAl Anba’, November 9, 2009.
  101. Jumblat, Press Conference, Beirut, March 14, 2005; inAnnahar, March 15, 2005.
  102. Jumblat, Press Release, Beirut, May 19, 2006; inAnnahar, May 20, 2006.
  103. Ibid.
  104. Ibid.
  105. The 8th of March Movement was a coalition of various Christian, Shi’a and a few Druze political parties, factions and leaders. This alliance was considered to be pro-Syrian; it included Hezbollah (Shi’a), the Amal movement (Shi’a), Free Patriotic Movement (Maronite Christian), Skaff bloc (Christian), Al Marada (Christian), Lebanese Democratic Party (Druze), Nasserist Unification Movement (Sunni), Islamic Unification Movement (Sunni), etc. The strongest factions within this movement were: Hezbollah (Shi’a), the Free Patriotic Movement (Maronite), and the Amal Movement (Shi’a).
  106. Jumblat, Press Conference, Beirut, May 1, 2008,Now Lebanon,,http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?IDĽ40595. accessed 10 October 2009.
  107. Ibid.
  108. Ibid.
  109. Ibid.
  110. Jumblat, Press Conference, May 16, 2008; inAnnahar, May 17, 2008.
  111. As confirmed by Talal Arslan, Press Conference, Beirut, August 9, 2008; inAnnahar, August 10, 2008.
  112. Ibid.
  113. Jumblat, Weekly Statement toAl Anba’, July 20, 2009.
  114. Stephen F. Larrabee (2009) Obama’s Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Challenges,Insight Turkey, 11(1), pp. 1 –11; Allan Ramsay (2009) The Obama Administration and the Middle East,Contemporary Review, 291 (1693). Available at:,http://www.docstoc.com/docs/44012349/THE-OBAMA-ADMINISTRATION-AND-THEMIDDLE-EAST.accessed; Mir H. Sadat & Daniel B. Jones (2009) US Foreign Policy Toward Syria: Balancing Ideology and National Interests,Middle East Policy, 16 (2). Available at:,http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/us-foreign-policy-toward-syria-balancing-ideology-and-national-interests. accessed 12 January 2010; and Prem G. Kumar (2009) Realigning Syria, Foreign Affairs,88(2).
  115. Jumblat, Weekly Statement toAl Anba’, July 7, 2009.
  116. Ibid
  117. Jumblat, Weekly Statement toAl Anba’, July 7, 2009.
  118. During the previous years, Saudi Arabia and Syria were in deep conflict over many regional issues ranging from Lebanon to the Arab states on the Persian Gulf. It is widely believed that Saudi Arabia is a major supporter of the 14th of March Movement while Syria is behind the 8th of March.
  119. Jumblat, Interview, Beirut, November 5, 2009; inAl Anba’, November 6, 2009.
  120. Jumblat, Interview Beirut, January 1, 2009; inAl Anba’, January 2, 2009.
  121. Jumblat, Speech, Beirut, August 9, 2009; inAnnahar, August 10, 2009.
  122. Ibid
  123. Ibid
  124. Jumblat, Speech, Beirut, August 9, 2009; inAnnahar, August 10, 2009.
  125. Jumblat, Interview,Realite´s Magazine, from Now Lebanon. Available at: , http://www.nowlebanon.co m/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?IDĽ106112., accessed 10 October 2009.
  126. Jumblat, Interview, Beirut, January 2, 2010; inAnnahar, January 3, 2010.
  127. Jumblat, Interview, Beirut, October 19, 2009; inAl Anba’, October 20, 2009.
  128. Ibid
  129. Jumblat, Weekly Statement, inAl Anba’, July 10, 2009. Jumblat (2009b) commented on his meeting with Nassrallah in an interview with Hezbollah’s televisionAl Manaron October 14, 2009.
  130. Jumblat, Weekly Statement, inAl Anba’, July 14, 2009.
  131. Ibid

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